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We consider a costly bilingualism model in which one can take two strategies in parallel. We
investigate how a single zealot triggers the cascading behavior and how the compatibility of the two
strategies affects when interacting patterns change. First, the role of the interaction range on the
cascading is studied by increasing the range from local to global. We find that people sometimes
do not favor to take the superior strategy even though its payoff is higher than that of the inferior
one. This is found to be caused by the local interactions rather than the global ones. Applying
this model to social networks, we find that the location of the zealot is also important for larger
cascading in heterogeneous networks.
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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the fundamental issues in social science is to
understand how new strategies, technologies, and ideolo-
gies spread and diffuse through population [1, 2]. One
possible mechanism that may explain this phenomenon
is bilingualism, where people can adopt two traits – such
as languages, technologies, and ideas – in parallel. Many
of the related researches are performed also in physics as
well as economics and mathematical sociology [2–4].
In the recently studied bilingualism models by Klein-
berg et al., a population with two early adopters has been
considered and how the compatibility of bilingualism in-
fluences the cascading behavior has been examined [3, 4].
Motivated by these studies, we investigate the population
with single zealot since we realized even one zealot can
trigger off the cascades. In particular, we focus on how
the interaction range influences the cascading behavior,
and explore the system by systematically changing the
range from local to global. Moreover, in order to see how
the compatibility affect competition in the real world,
we also apply the model to the real social networks, and
investigate its cascading behavior.
This paper is organized as follows: a costly bilingual-
ism model is introduced in Sec. II, then we reports the
analytic and numerical results on one dimensional ring
with an increasing interaction range in Sec. III A and
those of the globally coupled case in Sec. III B. In Sec. IV,
an application to social networks are displayed. Finally
we summarize and discuss our results in Sec. V.
II. COSTLY BILINGUALISM MODEL
Let us consider a population where individuals can
choose one of the three strategies A, B, and AB. A
∗ hhong@jbnu.ac.kr
† sonswoo@hanyang.ac.kr
and B can be regarded as two languages, and AB repre-
sents bilingualism. Learning multiple languages or tech-
nologies usually requires lots of time and resources and
thus we assume that the bilingual strategy is costly. The
costly bilingualism model is played as follows [3, 4]: If
two individuals with the same strategy A (or B) inter-
act, they get the same payoff a (b). If two with different
strategies – one with A and the other with B – interact,
no one gets any payoff. When a bilingual (AB) interacts
with a monolingual, each gets the monolingual’s payoff.
The bilingual individual pay the cost c of adopting bilin-
gualism. When two bilingual individuals interact with
each other they get the payoff of max(a, b) while paying
the same cost c. The payoff matrix is shown in Table I.
At each time step, each individual updates its strat-
egy choosing one among three strategies to maximize its
payoff with probability 1 with no transition cost. While
updating one’s strategy, we assume there is no change on
his/her neighborhood. In this model, a direct update be-
tween ‘monolingual’ strategies such as change from A to
B are allowed, differently from other model [2] where all
shifts between monolingualism have to pass through the
‘bilingual’ strategy AB. This cascading update contin-
ues until no one wants to change anymore. Note that we
do not concern the details of how one can change his/her
strategy and its transition cost. It can be an imitation
or adopting an already known-technology freely, to max-
imize players’ utility function.
We introduce a zealot, who does not change his/her
neighbors’ strategy
A B AB
st
ra
te
g
y A a 0 a
B 0 b b
AB a− c b− c max(a, b)− c
TABLE I. Payoff matrix of the costly bilingualism model.
Here max(a, b) represents the larger of a and b, and −c in
the last row denotes the cost of bilingualism.
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2strategy from the strategy A at all, in the population of
B. Then we study the A’s cascading behavior for various
values of a and c, under a fixed value of b, where b is set
to 1, and a is assumed to be larger than b. When the
number of interacting neighbors is more than one, we
rescale the value of a and b by its number of neighbors to
keep a balance with the cost c. For example, when one
interacts with three neighbors using A, the individual
gets the payoff a/3 per neighbor.
III. RESULTS
A. Local Interactions
We first consider one dimensional ring with an inter-
action range `, where each individual interacts with 2`
neighbors. ` = 1 means the conventional one-dimensional
lattice that each individual has two nearest neighbors,
and ` = 2 represents the system where each one inter-
acts with four neighbors (nearest neighbors and the next
nearest neighbors). We study how the cascading behav-
ior changes as we vary the interaction range from the
local (` = 1) to the global (2` = N − 1).
Figure 1(a) and (b) show how the individuals updates
their strategy for ` = 1, and for ` = 2 with the payoff
a = 2, b = 1, and the cost c = 0.5 [5]. For ` = 1, two
nearest neighbors with B next to the A zealot (colored
in red at t = 0 in Fig. 1(a)) first adopt AB at t = 1. The
next nearest neighbors then adopt AB, and the former
two ABs change into A. At t = 6, all takes A and the cas-
cade completes. The strategy AB naturally emerges even
though we start with no AB. The person who choose the
strategy B usually adopts AB first, and then changes into
A, but directly adopt A when the cost c is too high. For
` = 2, on the other hand, the four nearest neighbors next
to the zealot first adopt AB at t = 1. At t = 2, the other
four next nearest neighbors adopt AB, and the four for-
merly adopting ABs change into A at t = 3. The cascade
completes at t = 4, as shown in Fig. 1(b). The duration
of cascades decreases as the interaction range ` increases.
We investigate the cascading behavior at various values
of the interaction range, payoff, and cost. Figure 2 shows
the phase diagram in the plane of a and c for various
FIG. 1. (Color online) Schematic plots of strategy updates for
the interaction range (a) ` = 1, and (b) ` = 2 with the payoff
a = 2, b = 1, and the cost c = 0.5. Red circles represent the
strategy A (the one at t = 0 is the zealot who maintains the
strategy A), the blue ones B, and the green AB, respectively.
FIG. 2. (Color online) Phase diagram in the plane of a and c
with b = 1 for (a) ` = 1, (b) ` = 2, (c) ` = 3, and (d) globally-
coupled version of the costly bilingualism model, respectively.
For the phases labeled A, B, and R [see the text].
interaction ranges ` from ` = 1 to ` = 3 [Fig. 2(a)-(c)],
and the globally-coupled version [Fig. 2(d)], respectively.
In particular, we note that the phase diagram shown in
Fig. 2(a)-(c) is divided into three regions: Two phases la-
beled (in bold) A and B, where A represents the phase
that all individuals in the population choose the strategy
A in the long time, and B denotes the phase that all (ex-
cept the one A-zealot) takes the strategy B. The other
one is the phase R, where the strategy AB survives at
the boundary and blocks the A’s spread through B, mak-
ing the cascade of A impossible. This R phase appears
in the carved region of the phase diagram in Fig. 2(a)-
(c). Interestingly, people in this phase does not favor to
take the strategy A even though the payoff a from taking
A is larger than the payoff b from the strategy B. We
note that the phase R consists of 2`-wide ABs located
at the next to the A zealot and all Bs for the others, so
the number of ABs increases as the interaction range `
increases. In the R phase, the ABs shield the A-zealot,
which makes a AB-buffering zone, prohibiting the cas-
cade.
It is noteworthy to point out that reentrant transition
occurs in the phase R, e.g., for ` = 1 the population
shows the A-cascade for a = 1.5 and c = 0.1, but if we
increase the cost up to c = 0.3, the ABs next to the
zealot shield the A, blocking the A’s spread, which im-
pedes the A’s cascade. However, if we further increase
the value of c up to c = 0.6 the population reaches
the cascade again [see Fig. 2(a)]. We also find that the
area of this reentrant-transition zone shrinks as b
2
4`2 as
shown in Fig. 2(a)-(c) [see later], and the zone eventu-
ally disappears in the globally-coupled system as shown
in Fig. 2(d). This implies that the phase R is caused by
the local interaction not by the long-range (global) one.
We note that the occurrence of the phaseR has also been
3reported in Ref. [3], where the authors studied for ` = 1
case with the two early adapters (zealots). Our study,
on the other hand, exhibits that even only one zealot can
trigger off the cascading, furthermore we find that the
phase R strongly depends on the interaction range `.
B. Globally Coupled Case
We now consider the globally-coupled version of the
model, i.e., the complete graph with the population size
N , where each individual interacts with all the others,
and analyze the behaviors of the system. The phase
boundary between the phases A and B in Fig. 2 (d)
can be obtained by analyzing the break-even point of the
payoff. The payoff of the ith individual, from choosing
the strategy A/B/AB, is given by
piA = a˜(N
i
A + N
i
AB), p
i
B = b˜(N
i
B + N
i
AB), (1)
piAB = a˜(N
i
A + N
i
AB) + b˜N
i
B − c
for i = 1, · · · , N , where N iA, N iB , and N iAB represent the
number of the interacting neighbors of the ith individual,
who plays A, B, and AB, such that N iA+N
i
B+N
i
AB = k
i,
where ki is the number of neighbors (degree) of the i-
th individual. And a˜ = a/ki and b˜ = b/ki denote the
rescaled payoff for the balance with the cost c. For
the complete graph, all people has the same number
of neighbors (ki = N − 1) with no difference, which
allows us to suppress the site index i in the Eq. (1),
which reads pA = a
(
1 − NBN−1
)
, pB = b
(
1 − NAN−1
)
, and
pAB = a− c− (a− b) NBN−1 .
We now start with the initial condition that there is
only one A-zealot (NA = 1) and the others are B’s (NB =
N − 1). To choose the strategy A, the payoff pA should
be larger than the other ones pB and pAB . Similarly, to
take the strategy B the payoff pB should be larger than
pA and pAB , and to take the strategy AB the payoff pAB
should be larger than the others. From these conditions,
we find that the strategy A is chosen for
a > b(N − 2) and c > bN − 2
N − 1 , (2)
the B is chosen for
a < b(N − 2) and c > a
N − 1 , (3)
and the AB is chosen for
c < b
N − 2
N − 1 and c <
a
N − 1 . (4)
We find that Eq. (3) with the condition a > b (initially
assumed) determines the phase boundary of the phase B,
as shown in Fig. 2(d). On the other hand, Eq. (2) and
(4) decide the boundary of the parameter region where
the strategies A and AB are chosen, respectively. Let us
suppose that we are now in the parameter region where
AB is chosen. For a given value of a and c in this region,
the individuals first choose AB, the system then consists
of one A-zealot and ABs for the remains, i.e., NA = 1,
NB = 0, and NAB = N − 1, since all Bs except the A-
zealot turn into AB due to the “all-to-all” coupling in the
complete graph. We find that all ABs take the strategy A
next time since the payoff obtained from taking A is the
largest one, which makes all ABs in this region turn into
As and they remain ever since, which yields the phase
boundary shown in Fig. 2(d).
The phase boundary for the system with local inter-
action in Fig. 2(a)-(c) can be also obtained from the
analysis of break-even point of the payoffs of A, B, and
AB, similarly to the globally-coupled case. However, the
density-level description of the globally-coupled system is
impossible, instead the node(site)-level one is available,
i.e, we should decide the strategy of each node one by one,
considering all available situation. Substituting ki = 2`
and the rescaled payoff a˜ = a2` and b˜ =
b
2` into Eq. (1),
the payoff of each individual is obtained, and the same
analysis about the break-even point of the payoffs leads
us to have the phase boundary as shown in Fig. 2(a)-(c),
where the boundary has been also confirmed numerically.
We find that the three points which consist of the trian-
gular region of the phaseR located at the carved zone are
given by the three points (b, 0), (b, b2` ), and (b+
b
` ,
b
2` ).
Accordingly, the size of the phase R-region is given by
b2
4`2 , and it vanishes in the globally-coupled system. And
the kinked corner point on the side of large a and c for
` = 2 and 3 is found to be given by (b(2`− 1), b− b2` ).
IV. APPLICATION TO REAL SOCIAL
NETWORKS
A natural question we can ask now is this: does the
reentrant transition occur in a real social system, too?
How does the compatibility of the strategies influence the
cascading behavior in the real social networks? To ad-
dress these questions, we now analyze real social networks
and explore how the compatibility of the two strategies
affect the cascading behavior. We consider the Zachary’s
karate club network [6]. The network is known as the
social network of friendships between 34 members of a
karate club at a US university in the 1970s. The network
size is just 34, which allows us to do complete investiga-
tion of the cascading behavior depending on the location
of the zealot. In particular, we examine how the network
properties affect the cascading behavior.
We perform the numerical simulations on the karate
club network, where individuals sequentially update their
strategies [5]. The sequence of updates is determined
according to the expected payoff change; the node that
can achieve the largest change in their payoff get the
priority since the large potential payoff change can be
considered as a high social pressure from the neighbors.
Again we find that even a single A-zealot can trigger the
cascades in the karate club network. In addition, we find
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FIG. 3. (Color online) Final configurations for the costly bilingualism model on the Zachary’s karate club network for a = 1.4,
b = 1, and c = 0.2 (top) and phase diagrams for each case (bottom). Three representative cases are shown when the zealot
(colored in yellow) is located (a) at the node 33, (b) at 7, and (c) at 2, respectively. The different colors represent different
phases in the phase diagrams [see the text]: The phase A is represented by the red hatched lines; The phase B by the blue
vertical lines; The phase S1 by the orange fine shaded lines; The phase S2 by the sky blue fine vertical lines; The phase S3 by
the filled pink region; The phase S4 by the filled light blue region, respectively.
that the location of the zealot is crucial. We consider
all 34 possible locations of the zealot, and explore how
the phase diagram changes by the location of the zealot.
We obtain 34 phase diagrams for the different sites of the
zealot and find that the phase diagrams can be classified
into the three representative ones as shown in Fig. 3.
We find that, in addition to the phases A and B, we
have more phases named S1, S2, S3, and S4, where the
phase S1 (S2) represents the mixed state of the strategy
A and B with no AB, while A (B) is superior to B (A);
the phase S3 (S4) is the state where A, B, and AB all
coexist, where the A (B) is the superior one. We note
that the phases S3 and S4 include the AB-buffering zone
inside. The phases are represented by the different colors
as shown in Fig. 3. Note that there is no other phase
except these six.
Interestingly multi-reentrant transition zone appears as
shown in Fig. 3, which is caused by the mixed interac-
tion among the people with a variety of neighbors. The
network properties summarized in the Table II for the
node 2, 7, and 33, show that the system easily produces
the cascade when the hub is the zealot, as expected.
This is, however, not enough for achieving the larger
cascade. Additional important conditions are whom the
zealot connects and where he/she is located. The zealot
needs to have small clustering coefficient (CC), and its
neighbors should have small degree. High CC means that
one’s neighbors know each other very well and they favor
to share a common strategy, which means that they can
convert their strategy at the same time [7]. Therefore,
high clustering around one individual can be an obsta-
node i ki CC k¯inn BC closeness
33 17 0.11 3.8 387.1 1.82
7 4 1.00 10.3 66.0 2.27
2 10 0.24 6.6 217.7 1.79
TABLE II. Network properties. k¯inn means the average neigh-
bor degree, “BC” means the betweenness centrality, and
“closeness” represents closeness centrality, respectively [7].
cle to large cascades. Furthermore, one’s neighbors with
small-degree can be easily influenced by the zealot’s opin-
ion since its influence is reciprocally proportional to the
neighbors’ degree. We find that these effects are well
observed in the karate network, as shown in the Table II.
On the other hand, the case of the network with strong
community structures can be a different story. We inves-
tigate several target nodes in other social networks: Les
Miserables network [8] (N = 77), dolphin network [9]
(N = 62), and coauthorship network of network scien-
tists [10] (N = 379, only considering the giant connected
component), based on high ki, small CC, and small k¯inn.
We find that small CC, small k¯inn, and even high k
i do
not promise large cascade size since cascades often stop
after converting several nodes in a community even when
they start from the hubs. Therefore, the size of assigned
community or the centrality can be also important fac-
tors for the cascades when the network has high modu-
larity, which requires an in-depth study on the role of the
modularity on the cascading in complex networks.
5V. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
To summarize, we considered costly bilingualism
model in a population with one zealot, and explored how
the compatibility influences on the cascading behavior
of one strategy, extending the interaction range from lo-
cal to global. We found that superior strategy does not
necessarily propagate. In the parameter region where
this phenomenon occurs, the reentrant phase transition
occurs. We found that it is caused by the local interac-
tion with one’s neighbors rather than the long-range one.
We applied the model to real-world social network and
showed how the network properties take effects in the
cascades. We have learned the lessons that if the zealot
locates at the node with high degree, this is good for the
larger cascade. Furthermore, we showed that the small
clustering coefficient and small average neighbors degree
enhance the cascade. Finally, we demonstrated that the
community structure makes it hard to predict the cas-
cade size. If a network has high modularity, the com-
munity structure should be considered carefully, which is
remained for future study.
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